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S1. Model Description 
A CTMC can capture the initial disease dynamics and accommodate the uncertainties involved in the 
disease transmission process. It is also recommended given the small number of cases in the beginning of 
the epidemics. We assume an initial random number of individuals in the E, A, and I compartment given 
by 𝑒0, 𝑎0, and 𝑖0, respectively. The probability of transitions of the CTMC, 𝑿(𝑡), from state 𝑥 to state 𝑦 
(denoted by 𝑥 → 𝑦) in the interval (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡] for very small 𝑑𝑡 is given by 
𝑃(𝑿(𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) = 𝑦|𝑿(𝑡) = 𝑥) = 𝑟𝑥𝑦 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑜(𝑑𝑡) 
with specific rates 𝑟𝑥𝑦. The disease transitions in the underlying CTMC are occurring according to the 
descriptions and rates given in Table S1.  
Table S1. Description of modeled transitions and their rates of the CTMC between the SEAMHQRD-V 
compartments. 
Transitions Numbers in compartments that 
undergo changes while the rest 




For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑆𝑖 → 𝑆𝑖 − 1  










Becoming asymptomatic For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝐸𝑖  → 𝐸𝑖 − 1  
and 𝐴𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 + 1 
α(1 − 𝑝)𝐸𝑖 
Becoming symptomatic 
and mild 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝐸𝑖  → 𝐸𝑖 − 1  
and 𝑀𝑖 → 𝑀𝑖 + 1 
α p 𝐸𝑖 
Becoming symptomatic 
and severe 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑀𝑖  → 𝑀𝑖 − 1  




For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑀𝑖  → 𝑀𝑖 − 1  
and 𝑄𝑖 → 𝑄𝑖 + 1 
q𝑀𝑖 
Becoming severe and 
hospitalized 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑄𝑖 → 𝑄𝑖 − 1  




For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; A𝑖  → A𝑖 − 1  
and 𝑅𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 + 1 
μA𝐴𝑖 
Recovery of mildly 
infected  
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑀𝑖 → 𝑀𝑖 − 1  
and 𝑅𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 + 1 
𝜇𝑀𝑀𝑖 
Recovery of severely 
infected  
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝐻𝑖 → 𝐻𝑖 − 1 
and 𝑅𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 + 1 
𝜇𝐻𝐻𝑖 
Recovery of quarantined 
children, adults and 
seniors 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝑄𝑖 → 𝑄𝑖 − 1 
and 𝑅𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 + 1 
𝜇𝑄𝑄𝑖  
Disease-specific death of 
children, adults and 
seniors 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 𝐻𝑖 → 𝐻𝑖 − 1 
and 𝐷𝑖  → 𝐷𝑖 + 1 
σi𝐻𝑖  
Environmental 
contamination by infected 
children, adults and 
seniors 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 
𝑉𝑖 → 𝑉𝑖 + 1 
ω̃A,i𝐴𝑖 + ω̃M,i𝑀𝑖 
Environmental 
contamination by infected 
children, adults and 
seniors 
For 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑎, or 𝑠; 
𝑉𝑖 → 𝑉𝑖 − 1 
𝜌𝑉𝑖 
We use five social-contact matrices 𝑪𝑘 for 𝑘 =  𝑠𝑐 (school), ℎ (household), 𝑤 (work), 𝑜 (other), and 𝑣 (environment). 















A socially altered contact matrix ?̃? defines the contact rates between the three age groups with social distances and 
lockdown, where the column vector. The entries of ?̃? are defined by 
?̃?𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑖𝑗
ℎ + ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑘 (1 − ?̃?𝑗











for 𝑖 and 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑠. The vector (𝑝𝑐
𝑘 , 𝑝𝑎
𝑘 , 𝑝𝑠
𝑘) defines the proportion of those practicing social distances in 
the three age groups at the different location types 𝑘 = 𝑠𝑐, 𝑤, 𝑜, 𝑣, and so delineates the degree of adherence 
to social distancing. The parameter ?̃?𝑖
𝑘 is the government imposed closures and enforced stay-home which 
only takes values ?̃?𝑖 based on a policy turning points 𝑡𝑙,𝑖 in a way that ?̃?𝑖
𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖
𝑘  𝐼(𝑡1,𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0,𝑖).  
The environmental transmission has the component at time t is Vj for 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑎, and 𝑠, where 
ω̃A,i(𝑡) = ωA(1 − ?̃?𝑖
𝑣(𝑡)) 
ω̃M,i(𝑡) = ωM(1 − ?̃?𝑖
𝑣(𝑡)) 
where ωA (ωM) is the number of individuals equivalent to environmental contamination/deposit made by 
asymptomatic (mildly infected) individual per place. 
S2. The Basic Reproduction Number R0 and Probability of Extinction  
In this section, for brevity, we use subscripts 1, 2, and 3 for children, adults, and seniors age groups, 
respectively. We follow Allen [1] by approximating the beginning of an epidemic by a multi-type branching 
process for the types (A1, M1, V1, A2, M2, V2, A3, M3, V3), with extremely large initial number of susceptible 
in each age group to be almost equal to the sizes of their corresponding sub-populations. We use the 
offspring generating functions of the nine types (A1, M1, V1, A2, M2, V2, A3, M3, V3) that results in infections. 
The offspring rates for types Ai, Mi, Vi by types Aj, Mj, Vj for i, j = 1,2,3 are summarized by the following 
table. 
       Table S2. Offspring probabilities of column types by row types.  




(1 − 𝑝) 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑗




(1 − 𝑝) 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑗
 𝑝 ω̃M,jδij 𝑞 + μM + γ𝑀 
Vj 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑣
(1 − 𝑝) 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑣
 𝑝 0 𝜌 
The offspring probability generating functions with arguments 
(𝑢1,1, 𝑢1,2, 𝑢1,3, 𝑢2,1, 𝑢2,2, 𝑢2,3, 𝑢3,1, 𝑢3,2, 𝑢3,3) for the types (A1, M1, V1, A2, M2, V2, A3, M3, V3) are then 
given by  





(1 − 𝑝) 𝑢𝑖,1
3





𝑖=1 + ω̃A,j𝑢𝑗,3] + μA
𝑑1,𝑗
, 





(1 − 𝑝) 𝑢𝑖,1
3









𝑓𝑉𝑗(𝑢1,1, 𝑢1,2, 𝑢1,3, 𝑢2,1, 𝑢2,2, 𝑢2,3, 𝑢3,1, 𝑢3,2, 𝑢3,3)
=
𝑢𝑗,3[∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖?̃?𝑖𝑗













𝑖=1 + ω̃A,j + μA, 











for j = 1,2,3. The generating functions are not simple. The mean offspring matrix 𝐌 is a 9 × 9 matrix 
whose elements could be derived by differentiating the generating functions with respect to uj,k and then 
substituting for all uj,k’s by one. With some work, we can reach that   
(𝐌 − 𝐈𝟗)𝚲 = 𝐁⨂?̃? − 𝐈𝟑⨂𝐕 
where 𝐈𝐧 is the n × n identity matrix and ⨂ is the Kronecker product. The matrix 𝐌 is irreducible. With 












































































































and 𝚲 is the diagonal matrix whose entries are given by 𝑑1,1, 𝑑2,1, 𝑑3,1, 𝑑1,2, 𝑑2,2, 𝑑3,2, 𝑑1,3, 𝑑2,3, 𝑑3,3. Thus, 
by Theorem A1 in [2] it is easy to find that  
R0 = 𝝆(𝐁⨂?̃?𝐕
−𝟏) = 𝝆(𝐁)𝝆(?̃?𝐕−𝟏) 










ω̃A/𝜌μA ω̃M/𝜌(𝑞 + μM + γ𝑀) 1/𝜌
) 
Also, 
𝝆(?̃?𝐕−𝟏) = (1 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝑟 ω̃A/𝜌
μA
+ 𝑝 
1 + 𝑟 ω̃M/𝜌
𝑞 + μM + γ𝑀
  
Therefore, if  
R0 = 𝛒(𝐁) [(1 − p)










is less than one then the epidemic dies out with probability one. If R0 is more than one then there exists 
unique fixed points 0 < q1,1, q1,2, q1,3, q2,1, q2,2, q2,3, q3,1, q3,2, q3,3 < 1 that solve the system of 
equations  
fAj(q1,1, q1,2, q1,3, q2,1, q2,2, q2,3, q3,1, q3,2, q3,3) = qj,1, 
fMj(q1,1, q1,2, q1,3, q2,1, q2,2, q2,3, q3,1, q3,2, q3,3) = qj,2, 
and 
fVj(q1,1, q1,2, q1,3, q2,1, q2,2, q2,3, q3,1, q3,2, q3,3) = qj,3 
for j = 1,2,3. Thus the probability of extinction is of an epidemic that starts with 
(A1(0),M1(0), V1(0), A2(0),M2(0), V2(0), A3(0),M3(0), V3(0)) = (a1,m1, v1, a2,m2, v2, a3,m3, v3) 









S3. Countries Categorization 
 
Figure S1. Histogram of possible 𝑅0 from 152 countries [3] calculated at β = 3.5%, see the table below. Countries 
were split into 4 categories based on the quartiles of all of the 152 values of 𝑅0, which come to be 𝑄1 = 5.5, 𝑄2 =
6.07, and 𝑄3 = 7.11. The basic reproduction numbers of the four selected countries are: 4.86 for Canada, 5.75 for 
China, 6.12 for Mexico, and 12.30 for Niger. The possible 𝑅0 might have extreme values but that is only a reflection 
of the effect of contact rates and household age structure in case of no control measures. 
S4. Model Parameterization 







Demographic 𝑁𝑐 Children’s 












𝑁𝑎 Adults’ population 









𝑁𝑠 Seniors’ population 






2019 Population age 
distribution 
[4] 
(𝑚0,𝑐 ,𝑚0,𝑎,𝑚0,𝑠) Initial number of 









𝛽𝑐 Children infection 
probability upon 
contact with an 




𝛽𝑎 Adults infection 
probability upon 
contact with an 
infectious 
individual 
3.5%  [5] 
 
𝛽𝑠 Senior infection 
probability upon 
contact with an 
infectious 
individual 
3.5%  [5] 
 









3 to 7 days incubation time  = 
0.33-0.142 per day (range) 
 
[the longest time from 
infection to symptoms was 




𝑝 Probability of 
showing symptoms 







(estimated 17.9% were 
asymptomatic) 
 
Range:  0.5-0.9 
[7] 
γ𝑀 Rate of progression 











[8] Dypsnea (severe 
symptoms) 8 days after illness 
onset, range: 5–13 days. 
 
1/5-1/13 
= 0.2-0.076 per day 
 
 
[9] “the mean time from illness 
onset to hospital admission 








γ𝑄 Rate of progression 
from quarantine to 
severe infection 
   
μM (μA) Recovery rate for 














[10] reported that viral 
shedding continued for a 
median of 20 days (maximum 
37 days) in survivors and until 
death in non-survivors. 
 
[11] “33% patients of the 99 
infected have been discharged 
within 5-20 days”.  If we 
assume that viral shedding 
reflects the existence of disease 
then assume 14-37 days as 





















Depends on severity.  Best 
guess based on similarity to 
SARS 
Assume severe under 
quarantine are 100% contained 
 
“Duration of viral shedding 
ranged between 8 and 37 days. 
The median duration of viral 
shedding was 20·0 days (IQR 
17·0–24·0) in survivors, but 




σi; for 𝑖 =
𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑠 
Disease-specific 
death rate for 
















































[13]  Italy specific death rate is 
7.2% (1625 deaths/22 512 
cases, from Feb 20 to March 


















































transmissions were low. 
Estimated from SARS reports. 
 
[14] Singapore:  The secondary 
household attack rate was thus 
low (6.2% [95% confidence 
interval 3.9% to 8.6%]). These 
findings are in contrast to the 
high attack rate seen in the 
healthcare setting (6). One 
possible explanation for this 
difference is the phase of the 
illness. SARS case-patients in 
the household tend to be in the 
early phase of illness whereas 
SARS case-patients in the 
healthcare settings tend to be in 
the later phase. 
 
[15] China: Efficiency of 
quarantine during SARS 
 
[16] Hong Kong:  Secondary 
household transmissions 
 
[17] Canada:  Household-
member secondary-attack rate 
we found, 10.2%. One of the 
most important factors for 
household transmission was 
duration of exposure in the 
home. We found a linear 
association between the 
number of days the ill index 
case remained at home and the 
secondary attack rate.   These 
findings are in contrast to the 
high attack rate seen in the 
healthcare setting. One 
possible explanation for this 
difference is the phase of the 
illness. SARS case-patients in 
the household tend to be in the 
early phase of illness whereas 
SARS case-patients in the 
healthcare settings tend to be in 
















distancing as a 








𝑝𝑐 = 𝑝𝑠 =
1, 𝑝𝑎 = .5 
  




0.9 Assumption: Very few people 
will disregard public health 
officials. 
 
First travel related patients and 
contact tracing by public health 
officials would place all 
identified people and contacts 
in to “home quarantine”. 
Public health would seek 100% 








𝐶𝑉 = 𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑙𝑙  Contact rates with 
environment 
R=1/6   





sit made by 
asymptomatic 
individual per place 
1   





sit made by mildly 
infected individual 
per place 
1   
ρ Natural removal 
rate of the 
environmental 
contamination 
1/3   
𝐾 Cleaning rate of the 
environmental 
contamination 





S5. Additional Figures 
 2.5% lower limit Median 97.5% lower limit 
Canada 
   
China 
   
Mexico 
   
Niger 
   
Figure S2. Median and 95% quartile interval of percentage relative reduction in attack rates (see Equation (1)) for (a) 
Canada, (b) China, (c) Mexico, and (d) Niger. They are calculated at 𝑅0 = 6.47, with initially one adult mild infection. 







 2.5% lower limit Median 97.5% lower limit 
Canada 
   
China 
   
Mexico 
   
Niger 
   
Figure S3. Median and 95% quartile interval of percentage relative reduction in hospitalization peak (see Equation 
(1)) for (a) Canada, (b) China, (c) Mexico, and (d) Niger. They are calculated at 𝑅0 = 6.47, with initially one adult 









Country Starting time before the actual incidence’s peak 
30 days 20 days 10 days 5 days 
Canada 
    
China 
    
Mexico 
    
Niger 
    
Figure S4. Actual incidence for Canada, China, Mexico, and Niger at four different times (days) of starting the 
lockdown before the peak and lasting for 90 days. They are calculated at 𝑅0 = 6.47, with initially one adult mild 
infection. The grey curves are resulting from the stochastic model simulations and the black curve is the mean of those 

















Figure S5. The course of the cumulative actual incidence (a) and (b), and relative frequency histogram of attack rate 
(c) and (d) in Canada with no control measure (left panel) and with stating lockdown (right panel) of 15 days before 


















Figure S6. The course of the cumulative actual incidence (a) and (b), and relative frequency histogram of attack rate 
(c) and (d) in China with no control measure (left panel) and with stating lockdown (right panel) of 15 days before the 



















Figure S7. The course of the cumulative actual incidence (a) and (b), and relative frequency histogram of attack rate 
(c) and (d) in Mexico with no control measure (left panel) and with stating lockdown (right panel) of 15 days before 



















Figure S8. The course of the cumulative actual incidence (a) and (b), and relative frequency histogram of attack rate 
(c) and (d) in Niger with no control measure (left panel) and with stating lockdown (right panel) of 15 days before the 
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